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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kenneth Eugene Thurlow appeals from the district court’s order denying his postconviction petition after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In its opinion affirming Thurlow’s judgment of conviction, the Idaho Court of
Appeals described the facts and proceedings associated with Thurlow’s underlying
criminal case as follows:
In August 2005, Thurlow and Christopher Lewers went to a
junkyard armed with concealed shotguns and baseball bats. The victim,
who was working on his vehicle near the junkyard’s garage, was shot in
the head with a shotgun at close range. Prior to the shooting, Thurlow
approached a caretaker, who was working in the junkyard garage, and
asked the caretaker if he had any muriatic acid. The caretaker left the
garage and went to his residence on the junkyard property to look for the
acid. When he was unsuccessful in locating the acid, the caretaker began
to walk back to the garage to notify Thurlow. However, as he was leaving
his residence, he noticed Thurlow approaching. Thurlow told the
caretaker that the victim was dead and asked for help loading the body
into a nearby truck. The caretaker walked back toward the garage and
observed the victim’s body lying on the ground and Lewers standing
nearby.
The caretaker informed Thurlow and Lewers that the truck was
inoperable and, fearful for his life, fled the junkyard. After hiding out for
several hours, the caretaker returned to the junkyard and called the police.
During the caretaker’s absence, Thurlow and Lewers stole several items
from the victim’s truck, left the victim’s body behind, and sold the victim’s
possessions to an acquaintance later that night.
Thurlow was charged with first-degree murder, and Lewers was
charged with aiding and abetting. . . . Thurlow went to trial and, at the
conclusion of its case-in-chief, the state moved to amend the information
to charge Thurlow in the alternative with first degree murder by aiding and
abetting in the crime. The jury found Thurlow guilty of first degree
murder. I.C. §§ 18-204, 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003(a), 18-4004.

1

The district court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a
fixed life sentence.
State v. Thurlow, 152 Idaho 256, 257, 269 P.3d 813, 814 (Ct. App. 2011). The Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed Thurlow’s judgment of conviction on direct appeal. Id. at 257261, 269 P.3d at 815-818.
Thurlow filed a pro se post-conviction petition in September 2012. (R., Vol. I,
pp.44-53.) The district court appointed counsel to represent Thurlow in the proceeding.
(R., Vol. I, p.82.) Appointed counsel filed an amended petition which incorporated the
pro se petition.

(R., Vol. I, pp.103-123.) The petition raised numerous ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claims. (R., Vol. I, pp.47-51, 106-122.) In support of the
petition, Thurlow deposed his trial counsel, Linda Payne. (R., Vol. IV, pp.532-540.) The
district court granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal after concluding that
Thurlow failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief on any
of his claims. (R., Vol. IV, pp.586-597.)
On appeal, Thurlow challenged the district court’s summary dismissal of one of
his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims – that Payne was ineffective in the plea
bargaining process by allegedly telling Thurlow that he would only be convicted of
felony accessory after the fact. Thurlow v. State, 2016 WL 4920377 (Idaho App. 2016)
(unpublished). Thurlow asserted that if not for this advice, he would have accepted the
state’s plea offer rather than proceed to trial. Id. at *3. The Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the district court after concluding that there existed genuine issues of material
fact regarding the claim. Id. at *3-4.
On remand, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the remaining
claim. (See generally Tr.) Thurlow and Payne testified at the hearing. (Id.) After
2

entertaining written closing argument from the parties (R., Vol. IV, pp.634-650), the
district court denied Thurlow’s remaining claim and dismissed his post-conviction
petition (R., Vol. IV, pp.651-665). The court concluded that Thurlow failed to meet his
burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, Strickland 1 deficient
performance or prejudice. (Id.) Thurlow timely appealed. (R., Vol. IV, pp.666-669.)

1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984).
3

ISSUE
Thurlow states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Thurlow’s petition for postconviction relief because he established that trial counsel was ineffective?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Thurlow failed to show that the district court erred by denying his ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim after an evidentiary hearing?

4

ARGUMENT
Thurlow Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Ineffective
Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claim After An Evidentiary Hearing
A.

Introduction
Thurlow contends that the district court erred by denying his remaining

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim after an evidentiary hearing. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.4-11.) Specifically, Thurlow contends that the district court erred by denying his
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for giving him inaccurate advice during the
plea negotiation stage of the underlying criminal proceeding. (Id.) A review of the
record reveals that Thurlow has failed to demonstrate that the court erred in concluding
that he failed to meet his burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence,
Strickland deficient performance or prejudice.

B.

Standard Of Review
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of fact

and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are
clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district
court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730
(1998). A trial court’s decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden of
proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965
(Ct. App. 1990).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the
district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Thurlow’s Remaining Ineffective Assistance
Of Trial Counsel Claim
“Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil

proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations
by a preponderance of the evidence.” McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700,
703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007);
I.C.R. 57(c)).
A criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel extends to plea negotiations. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012). In
order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a postconviction petitioner must establish both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137,
774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).

The deficient performance prong requires proof that

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted). There
is a “strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Id. To overcome this presumption, the petitioner has
the burden of showing “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.
To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. “In the context of pleas a defendant must show the
outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice.” Lafler,
566 U.S. at 162. Where there is a claim that deficient performance led to the rejection of
6

a state’s plea offer, to establish prejudice the defendant must show (1) “but for the
ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would
have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea
and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances)”;
(2) “the court would have accepted its terms”; and (3) “the conviction or sentence, or
both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and
sentence that in fact were imposed.” Id. at 163-164.
In his post-conviction petition, Thurlow asserted that his trial counsel, Linda
Payne, failed to provide him with accurate information during the plea bargaining
process. (R., Vol. I, pp.50, 113-117.) Specifically, Thurlow asserted that Payne told him
that she believed he would be found guilty only of felony accessory after the fact, I.C.
§ 18-205, which provides for a maximum sentence of five years in prison, I.C. § 18-206.
(Id.) Because of this advice, Thurlow asserted, he chose to forgo the state’s offer to
recommend a fixed 10-year sentence in exchange for Thurlow’s plea to second-degree
murder. (Id.) Thurlow testified consistently with these assertions at the evidentiary
hearing, but also acknowledged that Payne told him, when they discussed the state’s plea
offer, that he could also be convicted under a felony murder theory. (Tr., p.6, L.22 – p.33,
L.24.)
In support of these allegations, Thurlow submitted into evidence a handwritten
letter and printed copies of I.C. § 18-205 and I.C. § 18-206 that were sent by Payne to
Thurlow in September 2006, shortly before the trial. (R., Vol. I, pp.72-73.) The note
reads:
This is the crime I believe you would/will be found guilty of if we
go to trial. Maximum penalty is 5 yrs. State v. Barnes is attached. It is a
7

Bonner Co. Case + explains how little a person has to do to become an
accessory after the fact. Thought you might be interested.
(R., Vol. I, p.72.)
Thurlow has failed to show that the district court erred in determining that he
failed to demonstrate Strickland deficiency or prejudice with respect to this claim. First,
as the district court recognized (R., Vol. IV, pp.657-659), the letter from Payne had little
or no relevance to Thurlow’s claim because it was mailed in September 2006,
approximately three months after the state’s plea offer expired (R., Vol. IV, p.537; Tr.,
p.51, L.8 – p.52, L.2; Defendant’s Exhibit 2). Payne testified that at the time she sent the
letter, there was no plea offer on the table from the state. (R., Vol. IV, pp.537-538; Tr.,
p.52, Ls.3-6.) Payne also explained the context of the letter. Payne testified that by
September 2006, she was preparing for trial and trying to determine which lesser
included offenses to request be included in the jury instructions. (Tr., p.52, Ls.7-18.) The
letter, Payne explained, was a casual, handwritten follow-up to a discussion she had with
Thurlow regarding what was the “least [Thurlow] would be found guilty of” based upon
the lesser included jury instructions that Payne would be requesting. (R., Vol. IV, pp.536538; Tr., p.52, Ls.7-18; p.56, L.11 – p.58, L.8.) The jury was, in fact, upon Payne’s
request, instructed on the lesser included offense of felony accessory after the fact. (Tr.,
p.52, Ls.19-24.)
Payne also disputed several of Thurlow’s allegations regarding the advice she
provided. Payne testified that she encouraged Thurlow to attempt to take the state’s plea
offer, and that she explained to him that under an aiding and abetting or felony murder
theory, Thurlow could be found guilty of first-degree murder at a trial even if the state
could not prove that he, and not Lewers, actually pulled the trigger and killed the victim.
8

(R., Vol. IV, p.537; Tr., p.47, L.6 – p.48, L.2.) Thurlow, however, refused and “absolutely
insisted he did not shoot anybody and that he was going to testify at trial.” (R., Vol. IV,
p.537.) Payne expressly denied ever telling Thurlow, while the state’s plea offer was still
open, that she thought Thurlow would only be convicted of felony accessory after the
fact. (Tr., p.52, L.25 – p.53, L.4; p.56, Ls.6-10.)
Payne also testified that it was unlikely that Thurlow would ultimately be able to
receive the benefits of the state’s plea offer, because the offer required that both Thurlow
and Lewers, his co-defendant, accept the identical plea offers made by the state. (Tr.,
p.54, Ls.19-24; Defendant’s Exhibit 3.) Payne testified that she did not believe that
Lewers would accept the offer, and that she informed Thurlow of this belief. (R., Vol. IV,
p.537; Tr., p.54, Ls.22-24.) In his evidentiary hearing testimony, Thurlow acknowledged
that Payne told him that both he and Lewers had to accept the state’s plea offer for it to go
into effect, that it was unlikely that Lewers would accept the offer, and that the offer
would only be open for a very short time. (Tr., p.9, L.18 – p.11, L.10.)
In denying Thurlow’s claim after an evidentiary hearing, the district court cited
the relevant precedent applicable to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims arising
from the plea negotiation stage of a criminal proceeding. (R., Vol. IV, pp.654-656.) The
court also accurately summarized the facts as set forth in Payne’s deposition and the
evidentiary hearing. (R., Vol. IV, pp.656-659.)
In light of this evidence, as summarized by the district court, Thurlow cannot
show that the court erred with respect to its application of either Strickland prong. Payne
testified that she relayed the state’s plea offer to Thurlow, encouraged Thurlow to try to
accept it, and never told him that she believed he would only be convicted of felony
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accessory after the fact. Further, for the reasons discussed above, Payne’s handwritten
note to Thurlow, sent well after the plea deal had already expired, does not support
Thurlow’s version of events. Based upon this evidence, and the district court’s implicit
credibility determinations made in Payne’s favor, the only proper conclusion was that
Thurlow failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that Payne provided deficient
performance in the manner alleged by Thurlow. A different conclusion would require this
Court to make its own contrary credibility determinations, which it cannot do. See, e.g.,
State v. Jones, 145 Idaho 639, 641, 181 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Credibility
determinations are within the province of the jury.”).
Thurlow has also failed to demonstrate that the district court erred with respect to
its application of the Strickland prejudice prong. There is no evidence in the record
showing either that Lewers would have taken the state’s plea offer had Thurlow chosen to
attempt to accept it, or that the state would have modified its plea offer to allow Thurlow
to accept it unilaterally. To the contrary, Payne testified that she believed it was unlikely
that Lewers would accept the plea offer. Therefore, even assuming that Payne provided
deficient performance in the manner alleged by Thurlow, and even assuming that
Thurlow would have chosen to attempt to accept the offer had the allegedly inaccurate
advice been given, it is unlikely that the state’s plea offer would ultimately have been
available to Thurlow. As a result, Thurlow cannot demonstrate prejudice from any
alleged trial counsel deficiency.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s denial of
Thurlow’s remaining ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, and the district court’s
dismissal of Thurlow’s post-conviction petition.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2018.

/s/ Mark W. Olson____________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of February, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic
copy to:
ROBYN FYFFE
FYFFE LAW
at the following email addresses: robyn@fyffelaw.com and robynfyffe@icloud.com.

/s/ Mark W. Olson___________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/dd
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